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Purpose: To investigate if there is a positive relation between companies’ risk of financial 
distress and the extent to which they hedge under the period of abnormal oil price growth and 
profit maximization for US based oil and gas companies for the period of time between 2000 
and 2008. I also intend to verify their hedging motives of using derivatives 
Method: OLS and LSDV multiple regressions will be applied to test the significance of 
dependence of companies´ hedge ratios on accounted-based Z-Score indicator of bankruptcy.  
Theoretical framework: refers to the previous research on financial distress relation to 
hedging, where Smith and Stulz, 1985; Nance et al, 1993; and Adam, 2006 proved the 
positive relation between companies´ hedging and probability of financial distress, stating that 
companies hedge in order to maximize their value by reducing risk of financial distress. 
Conclusions: For the sample of companies studied in this thesis the relationship between 
financial distress and hedging is negative. The considerable evidence of speculation and 
selective hedging in the chosen sample is found, while hedging motive of using derivatives is 
rejected. Firms´ leverage, growth opportunities and liquidity determine extent of using 
derivatives in the studied sample which is in accordance with previous research.  
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1. Introduction 
In this chapter the reader will be introduced to hedging as one of the aspects of risk 
management and functions of financial derivatives, as well as its relationship to the 
companies’ probability and vulnerability of financial distress. Furthermore, the problem 
specification, the purpose of this thesis and hypothesis of inquiry will be presented.  
1.1. Background 
The current financial downturn caused by Eurozone crises and other distresses in the global 
economy during the last decade keep adding pressure on companies and industries of different 
size and appearance. As an extensive tool against risk exposures, companies around the globe 
use financial derivatives, which have become increasingly important component of financial 
market in the last few decades. According to BIS, Bank for International Settlements, the 
world’s oldest international financial organization, amount of the outstanding OTC 
derivatives notional was equal to $693 trillion at the end of June 2013. This number exceeds 
the world’s gross domestic product that was equal to $75 trillion the same year. The 
representative figure below demonstrates the development of OTC market over the last 
decade (BIS, 2013). 
Figure 1.1: Global OTC derivatives market. 
Triennial and semiannual surveys, notional amounts outstanding, in trillions of US dollars 
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The notional amount represents a proxy for the value of the underlying against which claims 
are traded in the derivatives markets (Stulz, 2004). Derivatives are financial instruments, 
whose expected payoffs are derived from the values of other underlying variables, in 
particular commodities, foreign currencies, equity and debt securities (Hull et al, 2010). Some 
market players use derivatives to protect themselves against macroeconomic hazards that 
might undergo their commercial activity in terms of interest rate, inflation, currency rate and 
variability of commodity prices (Andersen, 2006). Others – use them to speculate on price 
movements of the underlying assets, having prior intention to make a profit (Gèczy et al, 
2007). Hedging is an extensive field of financial derivatives and assumes reduction of 
exposure to losses that appear in trading and investment activities (Bodie et al, 2000). 
Being generally excepted risk management strategy, hedging often hides speculative motives 
behind it, which affects companies` risk exposure and makes this area of corporate finance 
attractive to study due to its ambiguous motives and unpredictable outcomes (Stulz, 2004). 
Moreover hedging is characterized by limited research due to the confidentiality of risk 
management application and since derivative positions have been off-balance sheet items until 
recent issuance of FAS 133 regulation (Fang and Lin, 2007; Tufano, 1996). Consequently, 
corporate behavior on derivative usage is not well understood, giving rise to extensive 
research on its different strategies and creating subject for this thesis. Hedging as one of the 
functions of financial derivatives is generally studied on gold mining industry (Tufano, 1996; 
Fang and Lin, 2007; Adam, 2012) or oil and gas industry, due to the considerable exposure to 
a hedgeable risk factor, i.e. the gold or oil price, clear variation in hedge ratios and detailed 
disclosure of hedging activities (Croci and Jankensgård, 2014). Research of this thesis will 
cover hedging strategies in oil and gas companies. 
By using derivatives in the purpose of hedging, companies can maximize their value and 
reduce risk of financial distress (Stulz and Smith, 1985; Fang and Lin, 2007; Adam, 2012). 
According to Stulz (1996) and Campbell et al. (1999), financially distressed firms have more 
incentives to hedge than financially secure firms. Empirical evidence has been contradictory 
though and question about the relationship between companies’ risk of financial distress and 
level of their hedging activity is still open (Nance, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Mian, 1996).  
To test any relationship it is appropriate to place it under the abnormal conditions in order to 
disclosure hidden effects. The relation between hedging and probability of financial distress 
has not yet been tested for the oil and gas companies under abnormal market conditions of oil 
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price shock, which gives rise for foundation of this thesis. Hedging activity of oil and gas 
companies chosen to be studied in this thesis will be investigated under the time period 
between 2000 and 2008, which is characterized by extraordinary oil price increase. 
Tremendous increase of oil price between 2006 and 2008 has exceeded the price rate of the 
last hundred years, impacting companies` cash flows significantly and thus affecting the risk 
management view. In 2008 aggregate cash holdings in the oil and gas industry have exceeded 
with 400% the level they had in the beginning of 2000 (Jankensgård et al., 2013). This gives 
us a motive and occasion to study the companies’ risk management strategy under the unique 
market circumstances, namely when most of the oil and gas companies have experienced 
significant growth. 
Stulz (1996) argues that hedging increases the value of the firm through reducing cash flow 
fluctuations and probability of financial distress, as well as the expected costs of bankruptcy. 
Since cash flow volatility is mainly determined by the cost of financial distress and dividend 
payments (Fang, Lin), hedging of financial derivatives neutralizes cash flow fluctuation in the 
company and thus eliminates risk of bankruptcy and financial distress. Consequently, the rise 
in welfare of oil and gas companies between 2000 and 2008 must result in the low probability 
of financial distress at these companies and, hence, provide a low incentive to hedge against 
risks. The figure below represents the development of West Texas Intermediate, a grade of 
crude oil used as a benchmark in oil pricing, reflecting the dramatic swings over the period 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2014), and allowing us to investigate how amount of 
hedge in oil and gas companies was correlated with oil price development trend. 
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Figure 1.2: Oil price development between 2000 and 2008 
              West Texas Intermediate Monthly Price - US Dollars per Barrel 
  
 
1.2. Problem specification          
The roll of financial derivatives has not yet been fully understood: on the one hand we can see 
constantly growing derivative market and extensive use of financial instruments, on the other 
hand we can read headlines about scandal losses they have caused (Stulz, 1996). Hedging, as 
a function of financial derivatives, is a technique that is supposed to neutralize risk exposure 
and reduce risk of losses, that’s why often is used by financially distressed firms in order to 
increase their value and reduce risk of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, other functions of financial 
derivatives have been incorporated into companies’ hedging programs, prejudicing its’ 
motives and effects, when risk eliminating intentions are being diluted by profit-maximizing 
motives, turning risk management program into speculation activity with totally different 
risks levels, when companies instead of reducing risks are bearing extra risks in anticipation 
of profit (Ghosh, 2003). Selective hedging is another type of financial derivatives’ application 
and is not either so riskless as hedging, due to its inconsistency (Adam, 2006; Stulz, 1996).  
Hedging is often mixed up with speculation and selective hedging which can give 
unpredictable results due to additional risks that companies take. Whether financial 
derivatives reduce risk or enhance it depends on the nature of the motive of its application 
(Hirshleifer 1975). Extend of using derivatives is often associated with companies` risk of 
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financial distress, for instance Dolde (1996) and Love et al. (1997) have found that high 
leveraged firms, and, thus firms with high probability of default, are more likely to hedge. 
Adam et al. (2012) have shown a positive relation between companies probability of 
bankruptcy and how much do they speculate. Campbell et al. (1999) have explained that 
financially distressed firms have more incentives to speculate than financially secure firms, 
while Mian (1996) and Nance et al. (1993) have not found any correlation. Stulz (1996) 
highlighted that in order to be engaged in selective hedging companies need to have a certain 
level of financial strength and evidenced that financially distressed firms do not hedge. The 
results about how does the degree of financial distress effect companies hedging activity are 
therefore contradictive. 
The true motivation and understanding of derivatives usage, if it is of speculative, hedging or 
selective nature, is crucial for the companies, banks and financial institutions, in order to be 
aware of risks that companies in question undergo and to avoid exposure.  
The relationship between the degree of financial distress and the motives of using derivatives 
lacks evidence and therefore will be tested in this thesis. The time scope is chosen to cover the 
period of oil price shock, since the abnormal market conditions tend to emphasize the theory 
or disprove it more obviously. The relationship will be viewed between 2000 and 2008, 
covering both the period of significant oil price growth between 2006 and 2008 and also 
period before that, when prices were on the same level or slowly increasing. I believe that 
these contrasts in oil price development will have a great impact on the companies’ financial 
distress risk and consequently on their hedging strategies during the abovementioned period. 
Other motives of using derivatives will be under consideration depending on the interpretation 
of outcome results. The relationship between bankruptcy risk and hedging or other derivatives 
motives has not been tested before under the special market circumstances.  
1.3. Hypothesis and purpose          
Based on the conclusions from the underlying theoretical framework, the hypothesis of this 
master thesis can be formulated in the following way: there is a positive correlation between a 
company’s financial distress risk and the degree of hedging. The purpose of the current thesis 
is therefore to test this hypothesis using the sample of the 47 US oil and gas firms under the 
period of tremendous oil price growth and profit maximization for these companies between 
2000 and 2008. This gives us the possibility to identify the relationship between hedging and 
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firms’ bankruptcy risk under extraordinary market circumstances, namely to observe different 
levels of financial distress risk before and during the oil price shock, allowing to detect the 
motives of derivatives usage and how they change with oil price development under the 
abnormal market conditions.  
1.4. Limitations          
The primary limitation of the current study is related to restricted data source in the area of 
financial derivatives. Since derivative instruments have been allowed to be off-balance sheet 
item until issuance of FAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities, in 1998, and due to the complicated accounting of derivatives afterwards, research 
on corporate hedging activities is limited (Tufano, 1996; Fang, Lin; 2007). Most of the 
empirical analyses in this area have been performed relying on the surveys and rather indirect 
data, creating constraints for efficient and more precise research. The original sample of the 
companies studied in this thesis consisted of 74 oil and gas companies, but only 53 of them 
had available information on linear and non-linear derivative positions and only 47 of 53 
companies had appropriate information on oil, gas and natural liquid gas production needed 
for the calculation of independent variable figures. The limited data sample might cause 
nonnormality of the error terms distribution which can harm the interpretation of the results of 
this thesis.  
1.5. Outline of the paper 
Chapter two gives a review on the contradictory results from using financial derivatives and 
problems connected to the ambiguous motives of their application. Chapter three presents the 
theoretical framework with the previous research in the field and method specification, 
including model choice and data collection. Chapter four describes the empirical part where 
the analyses of regressions are interpreted, while fifth part summarizes the results and 
conclusions. 
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2. Should we fear for derivatives?  
In this chapter I would like to make an insight on the different motives for using financial 
derivatives and demonstrate contradictive outcomes that it might result in. True motives for 
hedging are difficult to identify, because hedging, speculation, and selective hedging can 
simultaneously be incorporated in risk management programs of the companies.  
Researches in the field of risk management and companies` stakeholders are concerned about 
different outcomes that usage of financial derivatives might result in. The title of this chapter 
is borrowed from Stulz` article (2004) and it is a very relevant question to ask when dealing 
with derivative instruments. As Nance (1993) summarizes, the main incentive for a company 
to hedge is to maximize its value by decreasing tax payments and expected cost of financial 
distress, as well as reducing agency costs. Stulz (1996) argues that by using derivatives a firm 
tends to increase its value through reducing cash flow fluctuations. Since cash flow volatility 
is mainly determined by the cost of financial distress and high dividend payments, using 
hedging of financial derivatives neutralizes cash flow fluctuation in the company and thus 
eliminates risk of bankruptcy and financial distress. Despite proven benefits that companies 
are to receive from hedging its risks, usage of derivatives is ambiguous and can cause serious 
losses (Stulz, 2004).  
Practical examples illustrate that hedging is carrying economic danger and the series of 
scandalous collapses that accompanies the history of derivatives proof exactly this. For 
example, the dramatic fall in earnings of the largest Canadian pipeline company Enbridge Inc. 
has reported a net loss of 300% in the first quarter of 2014 compared to the previous year’s 
profit predominantly due to losses on hedging contracts. Being involved in a long-term 
hedging program, Enbridge aimed to limit exposure to interest rate volatility and foreign 
exchange rate, as well as to secure the price on energy commodities by long future and option 
contracts, whose fair value dropped significantly when prices on underlying fell, resulting in 
337$ million losses on unrealized derivatives. 
1
 
                                                          
1
 Thomson Reuters, 2014, http://business.financialpost.com/2014/02/14/enbridges-adjusted-profit- 
misses-estimate-due-to-hedging-losses/?__lsa=a9f7-0f0 
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A series of hedging activities put a German conglomerate Metallgesellschaft to nearly 
collapse in 1993. Futures and swaps positions have been taken to hedge price exposure on 
forward supply contracts that assumed delivery of gasoline, diesel and heating oil over a 
period of ten years at fixed prices. When energy prices fell globally with 26%, the company 
ended up with unrealized losses on derivative positions, which were stretched out by the 
contango agreement during the whole next year, resulting in 1,3$ billion derivative-related 
loss (Edwards, 1995). 
Historically there are number of other cases when companies found themselves on the wrong 
side of the hedging positions. The collapse of Barings Bank in 1995, the oldest financial 
institute in Britain with the royal family among clients, occurred due to the significantly high 
positions established on Nikkei futures contracts, which crashed down after a gigantic 
earthquake in Kobe.
2
 Procter & Gamble hedged its debt risks from swings in interest rates and 
currency rates but lost $102 million on leveraged swaps, when American and German interest 
rates fell significantly in 1994. 
3
  
Long-Term Capital Management hedge funds’ strategy was to make convergence trade 
through mispricing in securities. By taking long position in the cheap equity and interest rate 
derivatives and short position in the expensive ones, LTCM managed to expand its frontiers 
due to dealing with highly correlated offset positions. Despite the up-and-running mechanism 
that brought LTCM multiple profits, unforeseen interest rate drop due to the East Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and Russian government defaulted on its Treasury bonds in 1998, 
exposed the fund’s highly leveraged investments and resulted in nearly collapse of the fund 
(Dolde, 1996). 
The list could be enumerated infinitely, which encourages to the fair question of whether 
usage of financial derivatives is that risk reductive or not. Does it indeed create value for 
companies? The contradictory evidence of the impact of derivatives motivates to investigate 
its true applicability and consequences they can have for the corporations. Whether financial 
derivatives reduce risk or enhance it depends on the nature of the motive to use them 
(Hirshleifer 1975).  
Derivatives can cause different risk exposure depending on if they are being applied in order 
to hedge or to speculate (Hirshleifer 1975, Stultz 2004, Tufano 1996, Henstschel 2004). 
                                                          
2
 Business Week, "The Lesson from Barings' Straits," March 13, 1995, 30. 
3
 The NY Times, Procter&Gamble`s Tale of Derivatives Woe, April 1994 
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Choice of the strategy effects the risk management approach of the company and 
consequently impacts the company’s value creation and possible risks it might undergo. 
Speculation is often incorporated into the risk management programs of the companies.  
Some studies demonstrate that for instance interest rate swaps and floating-rate debts are used 
mostly in speculative purposes (Chernenko, Faulkender; 2011). According to Gèszy, Minton 
and Schrand (2007), 40% of the observed companies in their study regularly using interest 
rate and exchange rate derivatives, are defined as active or non-frequent speculators.  
Nevertheless, this contradicts to the traditional financial theory, which suggests that benefits 
of using derivatives may only be gained in the presence of market imperfections such as taxes 
and bankruptcy costs, agency costs, financing constraints, undiversified stakeholders and 
managerial incentives, according to Smith and Stulz 1985; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993; 
Bessembinder 1991; Demarzo and Duffie 1995; Stulz 1984, 1990.  
Ambiguous conclusions gave a rise to the incentive to study whether there is indeed a 
correlation between financial distress a company might face and amount of hedging it 
initiates, as well as if using of derivatives is of hedging nature or there are other motives, for 
instance, speculative gains. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, the theories and models, which are designed to analyze the relation between 
hedging and financial distress of the companies will be presented. Primarily, the definition of 
hedging and other concepts of financial derivatives will be described, in order to distinguish 
them in the context. Furthermore, theory of hedging and financial distress will be presented, 
as well as the data sampling process and selection of variables and regression model will be 
specified. 
3.1. Theory  
3.1.1. Functions of financial derivatives 
To understand the linear relation between hedging and financial distress I would like to start 
with determination of the concept of hedging as one of the function of financial derivatives 
and highlight other overlapping concepts, namely speculation and selective hedging. 
Derivative instruments are widely used in order to hedge market risk exposures or to 
speculate on the price fluctuations of the underlying assets (C. Gèczy, 2007).  Investigating 
the intention to hedge among companies and hedging influence on different firm 
characteristics, researches come across footprints of other than hedging activities that a 
company is engaged in. Hedging often overlaps speculation both empirically and in the 
corporate finance literature, when analyzing the risk management strategies, researches get 
astonished by ambiguity application of financial derivatives. For instance, analyzing 
significant cash flow gains obtained from derivative transactions of the sample of gold mining 
firms, Adam (2006) challenges the idea of managers’ incentive to hedge could be based on 
value creation for shareholders by incorporating speculative elements into their hedging 
programs.  Declaring that the major cash flow gains are steaming from the “persistent positive 
realized risk premia” due to the successful hedging strategy, Adam (2006) highlights the 
evidence of “excess volatility in the hedge ratios over the time”, obviously indicating 
speculating activity (which though brings small gains to the companies in question). There are 
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plenty of other works distinguishing the nature of speculation, hedging, and selective hedging, 
such as: J. Hirshleifer (1975), L. Johnson (1960), G. Brown et al. (2006), Adam et al. (2012), 
etc. Determining whether usage of financial derivatives is of speculative or hedging character 
is crucial for the internal and external parties of the companies, banks and other financial 
institutions, as well as due to achieve compliance of financial regulatory policies.  
 
3.1.1.1. Hedging 
To hedge generally means that the derivative position is taken in order to reduce risk. The 
concept of hedging was presented in a modern way in the beginning of 20
th
 century by John 
Keynes in A Treatise on Money, described as a “normal backwardation”, a method of risk 
transfer, where hedgers were willing to pay a risk premium in order to relieve themselves 
from the price risk (L. Johnson, 1960).  
Smith et al. (1992) confirms hedging as “a process of making an investment in one asset and 
taking an offsetting position in another asset to reduce the risk of loss”. An essential feature of 
hedging activity is taking position in two markets: one market for the immediate delivery, 
namely “spot” or “cash” market, while the other is normally the future market (L. Johnson, 
1960). 
Let us assume, that a hedge activity covers timeline from time   to time   , with delivery in 
future at time   .  Assets of units   are purchased at time   and sold at   .  If    and    are spot 
prices and    and    are future prices at time   and time    respectively, the hedger will 
receive a gain or loss arising from the price fluctuations between time    and   , equal to the 
value of  
                                                                   [(     )   (      )].                                 (3.1) 
 
The position is perfectly hedged, when      
            
                                                                [(     )  (     )]                                    (3.2)     
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3.1.1.2. Speculation 
Speculation, on the other hand, is the “deliberate assumption of the risk in a strong 
anticipation of profit” (D. Ghosh, 2003). According to Keynes, speculators are willing to enter 
the future market only if they have the expectation to gain a positive premium, predominately 
they take long positions in futures (L. Johnson, 1960).  
I. Moosa (2010) shows the simple concept of speculation of taking a derivative open position 
with the planned intention to make a profit or increase risk. Such a position can be created 
either in the forward or in the spot market.  
Let us assume    to be the expected spot price on the asset   at time     , while the one-year 
forward rate on the underlying asset is  . The current spot price on the asset x at time      is 
 , while risk premia for bearing the risk is  .  
If the speculator believes the expected spot price on the underlying asset in one month is 
going to be higher than the one-year forward rate on this asset, the long position should be 
taken on the asset in the forward market and therefore a profit of 
                                                       (      (   ))                                                    (3.3)           
is gained. If the assumption is opposite and a speculator believes that the expected spot price 
on the underlying asset at time      is lower than the one-year forward rate, the short position 
should be taken on the asset with expected profit of 
                                                           (      (   )).                                                (3.4) 
 
3.1.1.3. Selective hedging 
Practice of selective hedging as a part of corporate risk management activity was identified by 
Rene Stulz in 1996 and assumes inconsistent speculative investments within the context of 
companies’ hedging programs, “by varying the size and the timing of the derivative 
transactions based on the managers’ own market views” (T. Adam, 2012). Extensive 
application of selective hedging by variety of firms has been confirmed by Glaum (2002), 
Faulkender (2005), Adam and Fernando (2006), Brown et.al (2006), Gèczy et.al (2007), 
16 
 
Adam et al. (2012). Empirical evidence, that companies at least several times have allocated 
hedging activity based on their own expectations of future interest rates, exchange rates, and 
commodity prices, have been provided in abovementioned works (T. Adam et al, 2012).  
According to Stulz (1996), selective hedging increases shareholders value and reduce 
probability of financial distress, in accordance with hedging. Nevertheless, it is consistent for 
the bigger firms, which have access to the superior market information; and firms that have 
low probability of financial distress and have a sufficient financial strength to take extra risk, 
which contradicts to the hedging determinants assumption (Stulz, 1996). Firms should not be 
overconfident though in their market views which might lead to needless risks (Shefrin, 
2001), since selective hedging is already a subject to additional risk for companies, due to the 
fact that not all assets or market exposures are hedged by definition, but just a part of them 
and just under a limited time (Adam et al, 2012). Accordingly, selective hedging can be 
identified by measuring the volatility of the companies’ hedge ratios over the certain period in 
time. Total hedge ratio is determined as the sum of portfolio’s deltas of all of the firm’s long 
non-linear and linear positions in units of underlying assets, divided by the total production 
over the same time period in units of the assets in question (T. Adam et al, 2006). Excess 
volatility in firm’s hedge ratios over time indicates that managers incorporate their market 
expectations into the hedging programs (Bodnar et al, 1998; Adam et al, 2006). 
According to Tufano (1996) the extent of derivatives usage can be measured as follows:      let 
   be non-linear derivative positions, identified in the firm, namely long put options in our 
case; and   be the linear derivative position, which consist mainly of forward instruments, 
futures, and swaps; the total firm’s production over the year is    the hedge ratio   for each 
firm   and time    and      will then be: 
                                                                   ∑
(    )  
      
 
                                                         
(3.5) 
According to Adam et al. (2006) selective hedging    can be identified as excess volatility of 
firm’s hedge rations over the time, i.e.: 
                                                           √
 
 
∑ (      ) 
 
                                                    (3.6) 
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3.1.2. Review of derivatives and financial distress 
Firms hedge in order to reduce the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy costs (Smith, 
Stulz, 1985). This approach of explaining the motive for managing financial risks is the 
starting point in my thesis. Financial distress is determined as a low earning state of the firm, 
which leads to a non-trivial probability of incapacity of paying its debt obligations (Gordon, 
1971). Financial distress “incurs significant cash-flow losses for a firm without being 
insolvent” (A. Purnanandam, 2003). How can hedging activity affect the probability of facing 
financial distress for a firm? According to Stulz (1996) through maximizing a firm’s value 
and eliminating the expected bankruptcy costs. Below there will be listed instruments that 
affect probability of financial distress, identified in the risk management theory, that arise 
incentive for hedging. 
Following Modigliani & Miller’s proposition (1983), that the value of a firm is unaffected by 
its capital structure in the perfect world of no taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information 
and agency costs, Stultz and Smith (1985) have responded that if the value of the firm could 
be affected by financing policy, it must be done in particular through these variables. Stulz 
(1996) argues that in the efficient market where asymmetric information does not take place, 
the value creation for a company could only exist due to the real resource enhancement, 
incurred by reduction in bankruptcy costs, tax payments, underinvestment costs and 
managerial risk aversion. 
Bankruptcy costs 
Stulz and Smith (1985) have shown that by hedging companies can save the bankruptcy costs. 
According to the corporate risk management theory, financial distress is costly and it is 
mainly evoked by the high volatility of firms earning. Companies that experience noticeable 
fluctuations of their cash flow are exposed to the higher direct and indirect costs of 
bankruptcy, as in Minton and Schrand (1999); Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993); Stulz 
(1990). Direct costs of bankruptcy occur when a firm with high cash flow volatility faces a 
state when it cannot cover its debt obligations and files for bankruptcy, therefore the costs in 
terms of payments to lawyers and accountants, court fees, the value of the managerial time 
spent to administrate bankruptcy and other professional fees are unavoidable. While indirect 
costs of bankruptcy include lost revenues, wasted investment opportunities, lost customers 
and other market players, inability to obtain a reasonable credit and difficulty to raise funds. 
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(J. Warner, 1977). Stulz (1996) has shown that by hedging a firm could eliminate the chance 
of bankruptcy and consequently reduce the present value of the expected bankruptcy costs as 
well as to increase a firm’s value. 
Tax expenses 
Stulz and Smith (1985) have also shown that hedging reduces probability of financial distress 
through reducing tax payments. Companies are exposed to the variability of the earnings 
generated by their assets due to the market fluctuations. Associated with unpredictability, 
variability can harm the investments and put under the risk the external financing schedule of 
the company, which is costly and needs to be neutralized (Froot, 1993). Since more volatile 
cash inflows implies the higher expected tax payments, by including hedging in the risk 
management program, the company neutralizes variability of its taxable income and reduces 
expected tax liabilities, Smith and Stulz (1985). 
Leland (1998) and Stulz (1996) describe increased debt capacity as another tax incentive to 
hedge. Namely, a company might benefit from adding leverage to the extent that does not 
exceed the sufficient level of probability of distress. By borrowing more the company 
increases its tax shield deductibility of interest. Empirical evidence conducted by J. Gram and 
D. Rogers of a significant sample of random firms has shown, that those firms which 
regularly implemented hedging activity had 3% increased debt ratio and incrementally 
capitalized value of tax shields, which expanded their debt capacity and increased firms’ 
value by 1,1 (Graham 2001). 
Underinvestment costs 
Prior research has shown that volatility of cash flow directly affects probability of financial 
distress of the company, due to the loss of valuable investment opportunities for the firm and 
due to the increased dependence on external capital market. High value volatility implies that 
a firm has periods of cash flow shortfall, which result in constrained withdrawing of 
investments and increased use of external capital market, Stulz (1996). According to Myers 
(1977), underinvestment costs occur when a firm gives up a positive net present value 
projects.  Therefore, limited investments incur higher contract costs, research and 
development expenses, production and advertising fees, which reduce company’s growth 
opportunities (Minton, Schrand 1999). According to Myers and Majluf (1984), external 
source of capital is more costly than using internal capital, due to additional transaction costs, 
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expensive interest payments, as well as taxes associated with dividend payments to 
stakeholders. 
Bessembinder (1991) argues that corporate hedging increases firms’ value by reducing 
underinvestment costs. It was shown that agency problem leads to underinvestment costs, 
when a having a risky debt in the capital structure, a significant value gains from companies’ 
investments is distributed mainly to bondholders, while equity holders often miss benefits 
from increased investments. Therefore shareholders often lack the incentive to invest in new 
projects that might bring additional positive Net Present Value. Debtholders anticipate the 
shareholders motive by turning it into the rate of return for issuing debt, while by hedging 
activities shareholders might bond themselves from such activity. Receiving higher priority, 
owners gain more benefits from new investment projects, motivating them to extend funds for 
rising internal capital (Skinner, 2007). 
Froot et al. (1993) confirm that firms hedge in order to reduce dependence on external capital 
by increasing interaction between internal funds and their investments. Due to the cost-based 
differences in internal and external capital caused by asymmetric information and agency 
problems, financing costs arise with the level of external capital, as in Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993). If a firm with a high volatility of earnings faces a shortfall in cash flow, internal 
capital could appear to be too scarce to fund a positive Net Present Value investment. More 
costly externally obtained capital compared to internal one arise incentive for hedging which 
gives corporations possibility to gain a sufficient internal capital in place in order to take 
advantage of desirable investment opportunities (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). 
Other causes of financial distress 
Other factors that can reduce a company’s value and cause financial distress are important to 
mention within the theoretical framework of hedging determinants in order to understand the 
scope of risky factors that can be eliminated by appropriate hedging activities. According to 
Stulz (1984) managerial risk aversion could be costly for a company and arise an incentive to 
hedge. Since managerial compensation is related to the volatility of company’s cash flows, it 
is profitable for a company to hedge in order to improve not only own but managerial welfare, 
resulting in reducing risk premium that managers demand, and hence their compensation 
(Graham, Rogers; 2001). In case managers own a significant number of shares, the volatility 
of their welfare becomes affected by the volatility of the share price, which triggers hedging 
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activity in the company. According to Tufano (1996) there is a positive relation between 
hedging and shareholdings, which implies that managerial risk aversion determines corporate 
hedging (Haushalter, 2000). 
Haushalter (2000) also associates hedging with the size of a firm, pointing out that hedging 
can only benefit to the company if obtained gains are larger than direct costs of administrating 
the hedging activities.  Graham et al (2001) confirms that hedging increases with firm’s size 
due to the transaction costs scale economies, since fixed costs in small firms limit hedging 
activities. 
The above theories confirm that financial distress has a value destroying feature. By hedging a 
company might decrease probability of financial distress and maximize its value, 
consequently the linear relation between probability of financial distress and amount of 
hedging is observed. The greater the probability of financial distress is, the more companies 
hedge. Nevertheless, companies that already find themselves in distress position don’t have 
incentive to hedge, as well as companies in “healthy positions” with long distance to default 
have a tendency to hedge less (Stulz 1996; Fang and Lin 2007). 
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   3.2. Method  
3.2.1. Selection of the model  
By using financial derivatives, companies can maximize their value and minimize probability 
of financial distress (Stulz and Smith, 1985; Fang and Lin, 2007; Adam, 2012). Empirical 
evidence has been contradictory though and question about the linear relation between firms’ 
financial distress risk and hedging level is still open (Nance, 1993; Tufano, 1996; Mian, 
1996). According to Stulz (1996) and Campbell et al. (1999), financially distressed firms have 
more incentives to hedge than financially secure firms. In order to control this relationship, 
probability of financial distress will be measured in terms of Altman’s Z-score which will be 
related to the extent of hedging activity in terms of hedge ratio.  
The article of Tim Adam, Chitru Fernando and Jesus Salas (2012) was taken as a starting 
point for my analyzes, where authors investigated firms motives to hedge and speculate by 
testing derivatives usage strategies on a sample of 92 gold mining firms, through relating 
outstanding gold derivative positions to various firm characteristics, such as firm size, market-
to-book ratio of assets, leverage, liquidity, Altman’s (1968) Z-score and Ohlson’s (1980) O-
score, and dividend policy.  
In previous research, influence of probability of financial distress on level and strategies of 
derivatives usage has been mainly tested leaning on firms leverage ratios, considering 
leverage to be the determinative variable on distress likelihood, due to the positive relation 
between debt size and probability of not being able to repay it (Smith, Stulz, 1985; 
Purnanandam, 2004; Nance, Smith, Smithson, 1993; Graham, Rogers, 2001;). Nevertheless, 
Altman’s Z-score (1968) seem to be more comprehensive measure of predicting the 
bankruptcy of firms, due to its extensive approach of analyzing a set of important financial 
ratios, which determine the companies’ overall performance. Moreover Altman’s Z-score 
have not been tested much in the contest of corporate hedging strategies, which allows to 
somehow contribute through this thesis.  
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3.2.1.1. Predicting financial distress 
Default prediction models can be classified according to accounting-based and market-based 
approach, depending on what kind of data is incorporated in order to predict default events 
(M. Crouhy, p. 438, 2002). Both approaches will be reviewed below, including most typical 
models for each kind, but only Altman Z-score model will be described in detail, since it is 
the one that will be applied in this thesis.  
 Accounting-based models   
 Accounting-based models rely on variety of accounting ratios, weighted on the sample of 
bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms (Agarwal, Taffler; 2008). First accounting-based prediction 
of distress model was originally developed by Beaver in 1966, who found that a number of 
different financial ratios, based on balance sheet and income statement data, could 
discriminate between paired samples of failed and survived companies with comparable asset 
size and operating within the same industry, predicting a bankruptcy by being tested 
according to the univariate approach, meaning one ratio at a time (Altman, 2000). 
Nevertheless, finding overlap in some ratios when exploring a wide number of them, Beaver 
suggested a multiratio analysis as a solution to exclude or eliminate the common elements and 
prevent overlapping (Beaver, 1966). Altman followed the direction and launched the Z-Score 
model based on the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) in 1968. According to Altman 
(1968), the multivariate model has potentially greater statistical significance and provides a 
simultaneous analysis of entire profile of different financial ratios related to the selected 
companies. The discriminant function was presented, combining a set of financial ratios for a 
grouped data set of bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms: 
                                                                                                                (3.7) 
This function transforms the individual variable values into a single discriminant score, Z 
value, which is then used to classify the object, where           are discriminant 
coefficients and         are independent variables, representing different financial ratios 
(Altman 1986).  
Altman collected similar to Beaver accounted-based data and combined it into the list of 22 
possible financial ratios, from which five were chosen as explanatory variables providing “the 
best overall prediction of corporate bankruptcy” (Altman, 2000). The final discriminant 
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function of five financial ratios weighted by the estimated coefficients was presented as the 
result of Altman’s study (1968), but modified later to the Altman (1993), using same variables 
but different factors: 
                                                                                                                    (3.8) 
where    = working capital/total assets, 
              = retained earnings/total assets, 
              = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
              = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
              = sales/total assets, 
Firms with Z-score output within interval between 1.81 and 2.99 are rated to be not safe and 
should be considered with attention, indicating “ignorance zone”, according to Altman 
(1968). If the value of Z-score is below the critical value of 1.81, the company is rated as a 
bankrupt with high probability of default. The Z-score greater than 2.99 indicates solvency 
and financial health of the company. Since    variable requires stock price data, the model is 
considered to be applicable just for publicly traded entities (Altman, 2000).  
Similar to Z-score, Ohlson’s O-score model (1980) represents a statistical bankruptcy 
indicator generated from a set of balance sheet ratios, with the difference of much wider 
sample of firms incorporated and ex-ante approach, meaning that investigated financial 
statements were not necessarily based on the occurred bankruptcy; also probability of 
bankruptcy is incorporated in the model (Ohlson, 1980 ).  
The ZETA Credit risk model was built in 1977 by Altman et al. as a “second generation 
model with several enhancements to the original Z-Score approach” (Altman, 2000). It 
appears to be more accurate, compared to previous methods, in assessing failed companies up 
to five years prior to bankruptcy with classification of 90% accuracy for the companies within 
one year and 70% accuracy within five years (Altman et al, 1977).  
A number of criticisms about accounting-based models were demonstrated in economic 
literature, based on the concerns about validity of the accounting statements, which often are 
considered to be the subject of manipulation by management as well as true asset value may 
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be very different from book values. Moreover, accounting statements are based on past 
performance and might not be informative in predicting future (Agarwal et al, 2008).  
Market-based models 
As a solution to misspecifications and overlapping concerns, as well as lack of the theoretical 
foundation noticed in the accounting-ratio-based models, contingent claims valuation method 
for predicting corporate failure was released some years after Beaver and Altman models 
came. The most widespread are Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) market-based 
models, which, in contrast to accounting-based approach, provide strong theoretical ground 
for predicting firm bankruptcy. They include both accounting and market information 
assuming market efficiency, without to be influenced by firm’s accounting policies. They are 
also assumed to be more appropriate for prediction purposes due to the market prices reflect 
future expected cash flows, and are not sample dependent (Agarwai and Taffler, 2008). Black 
and Sholes (1973) and Merton (1974) measure distance to default and probability of default, 
assuming that equity is valued as a call option on the market value of the firm’s assets. Some 
assumptions have to be considered: the firm issues only zero-coupon bonds, M&M world 
without taxes and transaction costs is implied, risk-free interest rate is constant and is the 
same for borrowing and lending. Thus, by determining if the call option is exercised, 
shareholders evaluate if the firm faces bankruptcy, which happens in case the bonds mature, 
due to the assumption that the firm only issues zero-coupon bonds. Distance to default 
calculation is based on the difference between the expected value of assets and the face value 
of liabilities, or the default point. Obviously, default occurs when the value of the company’s 
assets fall below the “default point” (Hillegeist et al, 2002). 
Being conceptually attractive, market-based models also suffer from misspecification due to 
the constrains, related to their restrictive assumptions, as well as measurement errors. 
Accounting-based models predominate in terms of reliability and according to many studies 
produce significant economic benefits over the market-based approach (Agarwal et al, 2008; 
Begley et al, 1996; Dichev, 1998).  One of the weighty arguments is reliability on the 
accounting statements, meaning, that firms with good profitability and strong balance sheets 
normally don’t file for bankruptcy, moreover, corporate failure is a process that matures for 
several years and is therefore necessarily reflected in accounting statements (Agarwal et al, 
2008).   
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Relying on the above-mentioned arguments, I will base my study on the accounting-based 
Altman Z-Score model, due to its simplicity and widely applicability among publicly traded 
companies, as well as availability of essential input. The scope of this thesis refers to the 
publicly traded oil and gas companies, which provide perfectly available accounting 
information needed for the Z-Score estimation.  
 
3.2.2. Econometrics 
3.2.2.1. Panel data estimation 
When a data sample represents information about different observations over a certain period 
of time, it implies a panel of data. The panel data representation can be balanced or 
unbalanced, combining both time series and cross-sectional units and embodying information 
across both time and space. The balanced panel dataset implicates that all cross-sectional 
observations are the same for all periods of time, while in unbalanced panel the observations 
could be missing or the sample could differ. In this thesis, the sample of companies that will 
be studied, assumes the same companies from year to year, indicating that balanced panel data 
approach is appropriate to use here. It allows to study the same sample of units and measure 
different characteristics as a function of time. It makes this method more advantageous 
compared to running multiple regressions for several observations at a single point in time or 
just for one observation over time, or compared to pooled data, which encapsulates the effects 
of all variables and their characteristics in the same model (Brooks, p. 487-488, 2008).  C. 
Hsiao (2005) emphasizes that panel data provides more effective inference and more accurate 
econometric estimates by addressing a broader range of issues and solving more complex 
problems than would be possible with pure time-series or pure cross-sectional data. Moreover, 
by combining time series and cross-sectional data, one can increase the number of degrees of 
freedom, and therefore, the power of the test, by employing information on the dynamic 
behavior of a large number of entities at the same time, which also helps to reduce effects of 
multicollinearity that arise when time series are modelled individually (Brooks, p 489, 2008; 
Hsiao, 2005). A general linear model for panel data allows the intercept and slope coefficients 
to vary both over observations and time, so that 
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                                                                                                     (3.9)    
Where   number of estimated companies,      is the dependent variable (hedging ratio),   is 
the intercept,   is a     vector of coefficients estimated on the explanatory variables,     is 
a vector of observations on the explanatory variables,     is a disturbance (error) term. 
The most straightforward way to deal with panel data would be to estimate a pooled 
regression, implying estimation of single equation on all data together (Brooks, 2008). 
According to Wooldridge (p. 128, 2002) “the idea behind pooled cross sections over time is 
that during each year a new random sample is taken from the relevant population. Since 
distribution of variables tends to change over time, the identical distribution assumption is not 
usually valid, but the independence assumption is”. While in panel dataset one follows the 
same group of individuals over time, pooling of cross sections over time assumes no 
replicability over time (Wooldridge, p. 129, 2002). 
In our case 47 companies will be measured over nine years period, consequently panel data 
representation will be chosen to estimate regression. 
 
3.2.2.2. Fixed and random effects models 
According to Brooks (2008), while estimating linear regression with panel data approach, 
fixed and random effects should be taken into consideration. Fixed effects imply that some of 
the parameters in the model (intercept and/or coefficients) are fixed in either dimension or in 
both. For instance, the intercept could differ cross-sectionally but not over the time, while all 
of the slope estimates are fixed in both dimensions. In order to understand the mechanism of 
fixed effects model, let us take equation (3.7) and decompose it in terms of the error factor     
into an individual specific effect,   , and the “remainder” effect     that varies over time and 
units, capturing everything that is left unexplained about     , so that 
                                                                                                             (3.10) 
According to Woolridge (2002), the main difference between fixed and random effects 
models is how to deal with the un-observed individual specific effect. It is called a “random 
effect” when treated as a random variable and a “fixed effect”, when treated as a parameter to 
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be estimated for each observation  . The fixed effect assumption means, that the individual 
specific effect might correlate with the explanatory variables cross-sectionally but not over 
time. By leaving out fixed effects that are related to the other independent variables, the 
coefficients for these variables can be biased, creating omitted variables bias. In our case, 
fixed effects are applied on the companies, that differ from each other but the difference 
between them might be related to other independent variables, like distress score, liquidity 
etc.  
Fixed effect model could be estimated with least squares dummy variables (LSDV) approach, 
which allows heterogeneity or individuality among in our case estimated 47 companies, so 
that  
                                                                                       (3.11) 
Where    is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for all observations on the first entity in 
the sample and zero otherwise,    takes value 1 for all observations on the second entity and 
zero for all other observations etc. Intercept   is removed from LSDV equation in order to 
avoid “the dummy variable trap” where perfect multicollinearity between the dummy 
variables and the intercept appears. The fixed effects model with LSDV approach allows us to 
test for whether the strict panel structure is necessary for the estimation process or the data 
can simply be pooled together and OLS regression run (Brooks, p. 491, 2008).  
Fixed-effect model can also assume time-fixed effect rather than entity-fixed as discussed 
above. This approach is applicable when the average value of independent variable varies 
over time but not across observations at each given point in time. The time-fixed effects 
model could be presented as follows: 
                                                                                                                     (3.12) 
Where    is a time-varying intercept that captures all variables affecting     that differ across 
time but not cross-sectionally, i.e. having the same effect on all observations (Brooks, p. 493, 
2008).  
As for the random effects modes, there are different intercept terms for each unit, which are 
constant over time, and the relationship between     and     is the same over all entities and 
time. The intercepts for each entity with random effects are based on the common intercept   
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and a random variable   , which reflects the random deviation of each entity’s intercept term 
from the global intercept  , and is constant over time but changes cross-sectionally, in our 
case over companies. The random effects panel model can be expressed as: 
                                                                                                          (3.13) 
where the dependent variable     is still a     vector of explanatory variables, but unlike the 
fixed effects approach, there are no dummy variables to measure the variation across entities, 
instead this occurs based on the random variable   . Random effect approach assumes that the 
new cross-sectional error term    has a zero mean value, is independent of the individual 
observation error term    , has a constant variance   
  and is independent of the explanatory 
variables     (Brooks, p. 499, 2008).  
 
3.2.2.3. Specification tests  
Hausman test 
In order to estimate the robustness of the empirical results, several tests have been employed.      
The Hausman test was proceeded for the regression with lagged variables, presented in 
Appendix 1 on page 51. According to Woolridge (p. 288, 2002), since fixed effects assume 
that individual specific term is correlated with independent variables, but random effects is 
inconsistent in this case, a statistically significant difference between them means evidence 
against the random effects assumption. In our case the null hypothesis was rejected, which 
implies that the individual specific effect is not correlated with the explanatory variables for 
the random model, meaning that the fixed effects approach is more appropriate. The result 
from the Hausman test is presented in the Appendix 1. As for other regressions estimates, I 
repeated them for the pooled OLS regression, fixed effects and random effects regressions, in 
order to avoid the possibility that results might be driven by omitted variables. Fixed effects 
model was showing the significantly higher    value in all cases, providing the best 
explanation of the regression.  
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Endogeneity 
In order to avoid endogeneity, which is correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
error term in the regression, and is thus violation against one of the main assumptions of OLS 
regression, the lagged variables were implied for all independent variables presented in Table 
4.2. on page 38. The result from the implicating of lagged variables does not differ from the 
one measured for the regression assuming variables in the same period, indicating that the 
regression does not suffer from endogeneity.  
Heteroskedasticity  
One of the assumptions underlying the classical linear regression model that have to hold in 
order to make valid coefficient estimates, is the assumption that the variance of the error 
terms is constant, also known as homoscedasticity. In case the variance of errors varies over 
observations, the problem of heteroskedasticity emerges, causing biased standard errors and 
inefficiency of OLS estimates. To identify the heteroskedasticity, the BPG test is appropriate 
to carry out, which implies that squared errors are regressed on the independent variables of 
each model. The null hypothesis means that the sum of coefficients is equal to zero, and in 
case it is rejected, the heteroskedasticity is identified in the dataset (Brooks, p.132-136, 2008). 
In our case heteroskedasticity was identified in all regressions but was adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and standard errors using White Standard Errors method in Eviews. 
Multicollinearity 
If multicollinearity appears in the regression it creates possibility of making inadequate 
inferences of the specification. It appears when explanatory variables are closely related to 
each other, which violates against an implicit OLS assumption that explanatory variables are 
not correlated with each other. This creates difficulty in observing individual contribution of 
each variable to the regression (Brooks, 2008). The correlation test, applied on the 
independent variables in the model, has shown that multicollinearity does not damage our 
regression, as it is shown in Appendix 2. Only Quick ratio correlates with Z-score with 54% 
which implies high correlation coefficient but still not close to 1, as for other variables, they 
correlate with less than 10% with each other.  
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3.2.3. Data 
3.2.3.1. Data collection 
Since derivative instruments have been allowed to be off-balance sheet items until issuance of 
FAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, in 1998, and due to 
its complex accounting afterwards, research on corporate hedging activities is restricted with 
limited data in this area (Tufano, 1996; Fang, Lin; 2007). The sample of the companies 
studied in this thesis with status on their linear and non-linear derivative positions between 
year 2000 and 2008, has been granted by my supervisor, from the own research archive. 73 oil 
and gas US companies have been examined in terms of hedging activity, namely combination 
of linear and long put contracts, pursued at least under one year within the highlighted time 
scope. 54 companies have been left after the first selection, which had to be matched with the 
production data to calculate hedge ratio on.  
Total production figure in thousands of barrel of oil equivalent, i.e. Boe, per company and 
year, extracted from S&P Capital IQ database, includes combination of total production of oil 
(Mbbls), total production of gas (Mcf), and total production of natural gas liquid NGL 
(Mbbls), see Figure 3.2. Millions of Barrels (Mmbbls) were converted into the thousands of 
Barrels (Mbbls) by multiplying it by 1000, while thousand cubic feet of natural gas (Mcf) was 
converted into Boe by dividing it by a factor of six, since 6 Mcf = 1 Boe is a common 
industry factor (Wright, p. 191, 2008).  
Figure 3.2 Total production 
 
Total production was not available for all companies left from the first selection, therefore 
firms with incomplete data have been excluded from the sample, resulting in 47 companies 
between 2000 and 2008 or totally 423 observations balanced data.  
• Oil Production (Mbbls) 
• Gas Production (Mcf/6) 
• Natural Gas Liquid Production (Mbbls) 
Total Production 
Thousand  of Boe 
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Accounting data was collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Compustat. Financial 
ratios, such as Altman Z-Score and Quick ratio were collected from S&P Capital IQ.  
3.2.3.2. Selection of variables 
Selection of variables and expectation of the linear relation between them is based on the 
theoretical framework. According to Stulz (1996), Fang and Lin (2007), and Adam (2012), 
there is a positive linear relationship between degree of financial distress a company faces and 
amount of hedging it carries out. If this is the case, than extent of hedging activity will be the 
dependent variable, the slope estimate in the regression will be the relationship between 
hedging and financial distress, while the independent variable will be an indicator of financial 
distress.  
Extent of hedging activity is, as defined in the theoretical framework, see equation 3.5, a 
company’s hedge ratio, while indicator of financial distress has chosen to be Altman Z-Score, 
according to the method selection. The relationship between these dependent and independent 
variables is expected to be negative due to the characteristic of Altman Z-Score. According to 
the abovementioned theory, the more distressed a company is, the more hedging it pursues. 
According to Altman (1968), companies with Z-Scores lower than 1.81 are associated with a 
high probability of financial distress and firms Z-Scores larger than 2.99 considered to be 
safe, indicating the higher score for more solvent companies. The relationship in our 
regression will be therefore as follows: the lower Altman Z-Score, the higher hedge ratio is 
expected to be.  
Traditionally, several control variables have been used in the risk management literature, in 
order to investigate what determines corporate hedging strategies. For instance, Tufano 
(1996), Adam et al (2006), Fang, Lin (2007), Adam et al (2012) have measured influence of 
firms size, leverage, managerial ownership, liquidity and firm value on companies’ hedging 
strategies. Taking into consideration the limited amount of observations I have at my disposal, 
the selection of control variables will be restricted accordingly and most commonly used of 
abovementioned variables will be included, in order to have appropriate degrees of freedom in 
the regression specification. The variables are specified as follows:  
Dependent variable 
Hedge Ratio 
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Total hedge ratio specifies how much of the company’s total production has been hedged over 
the year and is calculated as a fraction of the firm’s production, that is amount of linear 
derivative contracts plus long puts over the year divided by the firm’s total production over 
the next year. Firms hedge ratio is based on the estimated production for the next year     .  
Independent variables 
Altman’s (1986) Z-Score 
Altman’s Z-Score is the bankruptcy indicator based on the weighted key accounting-based 
ratios, combination of which determine the probability of default for a company, namely:                                               
                               ,  where   is a working capital (current assets – 
current liabilities)/total assets;    = retained earnings/total assets;    = earnings before 
interest and taxes/total assets;    = market value of equity/book value of total debt; and    = 
sales/total assets (Altman, 1993).  
Leverage 
Leverage indicates the firm’s ability to meet its obligations over the long term (Koller et al, 
2010) and is calculated as the book value of the long-term debt divided by the sum of book 
values of preferred stock, common equity, and long-term debt (Adam, 2012).  
Market-to-book ratio 
Market-to-book ratio of assets indicates the firm’s operating performance and growth of it´s 
assets, calculated as market value of assets divided by book value of assets. The market value 
of assets is calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of common stock plus 
market value of equity (Adam, 2008).  
Liquidity 
Liquidity determines the company’s ability to meet short-term obligations, such as interest 
expenses, rental payments, required principal payments (Koller et al, 2010) and is measured 
as quick ratio in this thesis, defined by the sum of cash, cash equivalents and account 
receivables, divided by current liabilities (Adam, 2012).  
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3.2.3.3. Multiple regression 
Prediction on the relationship between hedging ratio and Z-Score, as well as influence of 
other explanatory variables on the hedge ratio, will be estimated with the ordinary least square 
multiple regression, based on the generalized OLS model with several independent variables: 
                                                                                                    (4.1) 
where               are a set of     explanatory variables, and the coefficient estimates 
           are the parameters which quantify the effect of each explanatory variables on   
(Brooks, p 89, 2008). 
 
 Definitions of variables in the regression are following: 
 
    = Dependent variable hedge ratio. 
  = The vertical intercept term of the regression. 
     = The slope parameter, or coefficient of each independent variable. 
   
   = Independent variables (    Altman (1968) Z-Score,      leverage, MTB = market-
to-book ratio of assets, LQ = Quick ratio). 
    = The error term, representing the deviation of the actual observations from the estimation 
of the regression. 
 
 The following detailed regression represents the model of the thesis: 
 
                          
        
         
         
                         (4.2) 
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4. Empirical Findings 
 
In this chapter the analyses of descriptive statistics and regressions will be highlighted and 
main results of this work will be discussed.  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
I would like to start the analysis with descriptive statistics that is extracted from Eviews and 
summarized in Table 4.1. All variables in the model for 47 oil and gas companies between 
2000 and 2008 are described with mean, median, and standard deviation. It is interesting to 
notify that the mean of the Z-Score variable for the sample companies is 1.9, which is higher 
than the lower border of the “ignorance zone” in the Altman’s model (1968), specifying that 
firms with Z-Score less than 1.81 are associated with the high probability of distress. Mean of 
1.91 in our sample identifies that the firms are not distressed on average. This makes sense 
and is in accordance with the assumption, that most of the oil and gas companies between 
2000 and 2008 have maximized their profits because of strong growth in oil price. Adam et al. 
(2012) describes that selective hedging could be identified with high volatility of hedge ratio. 
Hedge ratio in our sample is quite volatile with 31% standard deviation, indicating that 
hedging was not constant over time and that managers in the observed companies 
incorporated their market views into the companies’ hedging programs, indicating selective 
hedging and speculation that firms were engaged in, according to Adam (2006), Stulz (1996) 
and Bodnar et al (1998). Companies are leveraged with 40% on average, which implies quite 
high debt and, thus, indicates considerable risk for financial distress. 
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4.1. Average over Time 
To have a brief overview over how variables are related to each other, the schematic 
relationship between them is presented below in Figure 4.1 as a typical example based on the 
average over time indicator by calculating the mean of each variable cross-sectionally 
(measured for all companies) over each year. 
Figure 4.1 Interdependence of variables
 
Table 4.1  Summary statistics for all variables in the model
Hedge ratio LEV MTB Quick ratio Z-Score
 Mean 0,25 0,40 1,98 0,80 1,90
 Median 0,11 0,27 1,30 0,70 1,72
 Maximum 1,73 31,22 23,39 4,90 10,42
 Minimum 0,00 -3,67 -3,32 0,00 -1,70
 Std. Dev. 0,31 1,58 2,80 0,70 1,47
 Skewness 1,30 17,63 4,40 2,79 1,36
 Kurtosis 4,55 345,24 26,53 13,96 6,98
 Jarque-Bera 160 2071525 11047 2646 406
 Probability 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
 Sum 104,18 169,26 831,98 337,00 799,04
 Sum Sq. Dev. 39,47 1048,03 3281,61 207,26 910,12
 Observations 420 420 420 420 420
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
R
at
io
s 
Hedge Ratio Z-score Leverage Liquidity Market-to-Book ration of assets
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By average over time indicator we can see the inverse relation between Hedge ratio and Z-
Score, which corresponds to the theoretical framework and acknowledges the hypothesis at 
first glance. Hedge ratio is increasing slightly after 2005, when oil prices peak with several 
hundred percent according to the Figure 1.2 , while probability of default is also increasing 
during the same time, due to the fact that Z-Score falls. Market-to-book ratio of assets is 
dropping during the time oil price peaks, indicating high volatility of stock market during the 
price shock time, and, thus, lower growth of the companies’ assets.  
 
4.2. Analyses of regressions 
 
Regressions presented in the tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 are provided with symbols ***, **, and *, 
denoting statistically significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  According to 
the Table 4.2, the results of the pooled OLS regression, fixed effects and random effects 
regressions, proceeded in Eviews, are presented for all variables, and corrected for the White 
cross-section standard errors and correlation, which means automatic identification and 
correction for heteroskedasticity. I have chosen to estimate three regression methods 
simultaneously due to take into account all possible outcomes and thus reach more complete 
Table 4.2  Panel data analysis of the financial distress effect on hedging
POOLED FE RE
Altman`s Z-Score 0.017785* 0.046426*** 0.018922***
(0.007863) (0.011372) 0.006592
probability 0.0242 0.0001 0.0043
Leverage 0.008787*** 0.004476 0.009564***
(0.002393) (0.004176) (0.002866)
probability 0.0003 0.2846 0.0009
Quick ratio  - 0.054316***  - 0.033987**  - 0.043323**
(0.015166) (0.016485) (0.015266)
probability 0.0004 0.0399 0.0048
Market-to-book ratio of assets 0.000464  - 0.017471** 0.002120
(0.004332) (0.007645) (0.004670)
probability 0.9148 0.0229 0.6501
Number of observations 420 420 420
R-squared 0.012530 0.350881 0.011433
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and valid results and allow the possibility that some results may be driven by omitted 
variables when repeat panel regression with fixed effects, random effects and simply pool 
data. Three of four independent variables in every model are significant in explaining the 
variation in companies’ hedge ratios, for instance, in pooled OLS and in random effect: Z-
Score, leverage and quick ratio has an effect on how much companies hedge, while in fixed 
effect model: Z-Score, quick ratio and market-to-book ratio has this effect. Quick ratio has a 
negative influence on hedge ratio in all three models, this is consistent with Adams results 
both in 2006 and in 2012, meaning that companies with high liquidity don’t hedge much. 
Fixed effects model seem to demonstrate the highest effect of chosen independent variables 
on hedge ratio, its’    suggests that 35% of the variation in hedging is caused by the effect of 
the companies’ bankruptcy risk, liquidity and operating performance, while for other two 
models the effect of the listed variables is just 1%. Last and most important conclusion to 
draw on this set of regressions is that probability of financial distress (Z-Score indicator) 
shows strong significance at the 1% level for the fixed effect model and at the 5% level for 
the random effects model, indicating hereby an influence on companies’ extent of hedging in 
these two models. The relationship is though positive, which contradicts to the hypothesis and 
initial theoretical baseline. According to the results in Table 4.1, the companies in the chosen 
sample hedge more, the less financially distressed they are, because the higher Z-Score is, the 
more financially strong companies are. This interesting inconsistency with the theory 
indicates pure speculative motives of the companies in question, who were exploiting growing 
oil market by “taking derivative positions with the planned intention to make a profit” 
according to Moosa’s (2010) definition, which rejects hedging motives for using derivatives 
with primary purpose of risk reduction. The strong positive relation between hedge ratio and 
companies’ solvency also confirms the reasoning in Stulz’s (1996) and Adam (2012) theory 
that companies need to have a certain level of financial strength in order to execute hedging. 
They argue also that companies that are already in financial distress or very close to it are not 
interested in risk reduction and do not have spare capital to spend on effective risk 
management programs.  
Contradiction to the theory can sometimes be the consequence of simultaneity bias, which 
occurs when independent variable   and one of the explanatory variables appear in 
equilibrium so that either    causes    or equally   can cause  . Simultaneity bias can lead to 
endogeneity, which is correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term in the 
regression, and is thus violation against one of the main assumptions of OLS regression, 
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causing biased and inconsistent regression estimates and leading to unreliable inference 
(Roberts and Whited, 2011). Measuring hedge ratio and independent variables that might 
effect the extent to which companies hedge during the same year, might cause ambiguity of 
the effect and hence simultaneity bias. In order to see what has in fact influenced hedge ratio 
it is appropriate to study the effect from the previous period on the next period hedge ratio, 
this excludes simultaneity bias due to the fact that hedging cannot make an effect post factum. 
To test for simultaneity in the variables of the regression and exclude endogeneity, the 
estimation was proceeded with lagged values, meaning that independent variables were 
measured in the previous period     and dependent in the current period   (Brooks, p 140, 
2008). The result of pooled, fixed effect and random effect regression estimates with lagged 
explanatory variables is presented below: 
 
The outcomes of the panel data regression with lagged values in Table 4.2 shows the same 
effect as measured for the variables in the same period presented in the previous Table 4.1., 
namely that Z-score has the positive impact on the extent of hedging. The unchanged effect 
implies that no simultaneous bias has affected the result in the previous regressions set. The 
difference is though, that fewer variables are significant in the outcome, probably due to the 
fewer observations in the estimations, since the amount of years is now reduced to eight. For 
instance the main independent variable Z-Score in pooled least squares regression seems to 
have no effect on the hedge ratio, i.e. is statistically insignificant. Hausman test, described 
Table 4.2  Panel data analysis with lagged values
POOLED FE RE
Altman`s Z-Score ( -1) 0.017686 0.056375** 0.039506**
(0.016351) (0.018136) (0.019354)
probability 0.2801 0.0020 0.0419
Leverage ( - 1) 0.008859** 0.004091 0.005943
(0.004063) (0.003541) (0.005019)
probability 0.0299 0.2487 0.2372
Quick ratio ( - 1)  - 0.034334* 0.002226 -0.016917
(0.019387) (0.027581) (0.025747)
probability 0.0774 0.9357 0.5116
Market-to-book ratio of assets 0.001337  - 0.020517***  - 0.010644***
( - 1) (0.003491) (0.005502) (0.002925)
probability 0.7019 0.0002 0.0003
Number of observations 374 374 374
R-squared 0.007696 0.386460 0.031814
39 
 
before, confirms in this case that fixed effects model is more appropriate for the current 
model, the result for the test is presented in Appendix 1. All regressions in Table 4.2 are 
corrected for standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and with firm serial correlation in 
Eviews with White cross-section method.  
The next regression set presented in Table 4.3 have been estimated with least squares dummy 
variables (LSDV) approach, including time dummies in order to investigate the effect of the 
dramatic oil price increase and also the impact on hedging before the oil price shock when oil 
prices were close to constant. For this purpose time dummies have been added for 2006, 2007 
and 2008 years in order to test for the effect of the peaking oil price during this period, as well 
for 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 years to compare with the period when oil price was quite 
constant and should not have given an impact on corporate hedging. The Hausman test has 
shown that the best model to use in this context is fixed effects model, that’s why other types 
of estimations are not carried out in this case. The results are very revealing, demonstrating 
exactly the below mentioned assumption. Namely, positive coefficients and strong statistical 
significance at the less than 1% level is noticed for time dummy variables during all years 
when oil price was peaking, namely 2006, 2007 and 2008, while other time dummies are not 
significant in a single year, and thus do not have any effect on hedging. Altman’s Z-Score is 
not significant in this regression, even after adjusting for standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and firm serial correlation, meaning that degree of financial distress have 
no impact on companies’ amount of hedging under the period of oil price growth. This 
confirms the speculative motives of the observed companies, because degree of financial 
distress was not taken into account, demonstrating therefore that companies’ intention to use 
derivative instruments was not initiated by hedging or risk management motives, but clearly 
by profit maximization motives or speculation and also by selective hedging. According to the 
risk management theory described before, financially distressed companies win most on 
hedging. In our case, companies hedge mostly when their welfare is maximized and when the 
oil price is showing 400% growth, which has of course nothing to do with “reduction of loss 
risk” intention as hedging is defined, but is explained instead by “taking offset position with 
strong anticipation of profit” which is the speculation definition from the theory chapter. 
Selective hedging motive also explains the current regression result, since it implies 
“incorporation of management own market views in the company’s risk management 
program” as defined by Adam (2006) and Stulz (1996), which makes sense in the given 
situation, when, having high expectations on the oil market due to its strong growth, 
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management of the companies decided to actively use financial derivatives following the oil 
price increase.  
 
 
 
Table 4.3 FE panel data estimate with time dummy variables 
FE
Altman`s Z-Score -0.044461
(0.057108)
probability 0.4436
Leverage 1.874923**
(0.815728)
probability 0.0314
Quick ratio -0.177205
(0.120761)
probability 0.1564
Market-to-book ratio of assets 0.132646**
(0.069207)
probability 0.0684
Dummy 2006 0.205880***
(0.009714)
probability 0.0000
Dummy 2007 0.674199***
0.013957
probability 0.0000
Dummy 2008 0.465444***
(0.025817)
probability 0.0000
Dummy 2000 -0.032212
(0.055968)
probability 0.5701
Dummy2001 -0.176973
(0.069725)
probability 0.1599
Dummy2002 -0.097439
(0.061456)
probability 0.1254
Dummy2003 0.105755
(0.113105)
probability 0.3599
Number of observations 38
R-squared 0.763341
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5. Summary and conclusions 
 
This section summaries research performed in this master thesis, including the study 
motivation, main theories which were reviewed, the choice of method and execution of 
regressions to prove the hypothesis. Conclusions of the results are presented and further 
studies in the field are suggested.    
5.1. Summary 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how does the risk of financial distress effect extent 
to which companies’ hedge and to study this relationship under the abnormal market 
conditions of tremendous oil price increase. A number of scandalous collapses caused by 
operations with derivative instruments and at the same time extensive growth of derivatives 
market awakes interest of studying the fundamental principles of hedging, as one of the main 
functions of derivatives use. The theory of risk management says, that by hedging companies 
can maximize their value and reduce risk of financial distress, therefore the more financially 
distressed firms are the more incentive to hedge they have (Stulz and Smith, 1985; Fang and 
Lin, 2007; Adam, 2012, Campbell et al, 1999).  However, the empirical evidence of this 
theory is ambiguous and there are studies disproving the positive relationship between degree 
of financial distress and extent of hedging. For instance, Tufano (1996) has not found value-
maximizing motives for hedging and thus has not confirmed that financially distressed firms 
hedge more in order to increase their value. Stulz (1996) argues that financially distressed 
companies do not hedge a lot, because firms need to have sufficient financial strength to take 
additional risks that has to do with using financial derivatives without jeopardizing their core 
business.  
The main objective of this master thesis is to make attempt to prove the existence of 
relationship between degree of financial distress and hedging by studying 47 US oil and gas 
companies under the period of oil price shock. Moreover, the hedging motive of using 
derivative instruments at the observed sample of companies are questioned in this study, since 
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hedging is often mixed up with other strategies of derivative instruments, namely speculation 
and selective hedging are often incorporated in companies’ risk management programs. It is 
important to distinguish between these strategies and understand which of them to imply in 
order to take efficient decisions and be aware of possible risks they can cause. There are no 
clear boundaries of these strategies defined in the risk management literature, indicating what 
consequences one or another might have. In this master thesis the fundamental definition of 
these concepts is presented and motives for using one or another in the observed sample of 
companies are extracted.  
Proxy for testing the relationship between financial distress and hedging was based on 
Altman’s Z-Score and hedge ratio indicators, relying on the previous research in this area. 
Altman’s Z-Score is an accounting-based model for predicting firms´ bankruptcy, based on 
the weighted set of financial ratios calculated for a sample of failed and nonfailed firms, 
combination of which determines the probability of default for a company. It is widely 
applicable measure of bankruptcy for publicly listed companies, remarkable for its validity 
and simplicity to apply. Extent of hedging is measured as a fraction of the firm’s estimated 
production, computed as the amount of linear derivative contracts plus long puts over the year 
divided by the firm’s total production over the next year.  
A number of control variables have been included in analysis in order to support to identify 
what more determines the extent of hedging. Relying on previous studies, the variation in the 
amount of hedging could be explained by the firms´ leverage, market-to-book ratio of assets, 
and liquidity. The OLS multiple regression was run with random and fixed effects to 
investigate the relationship allowing an un-observed individual effect correlate with 
explanatory variables for each company and also be independent from them, in order to avoid 
the results of the regression to be driven by omitted variables.  
Lagged explanatory variables were used in order to avoid endogeneity in the regression and 
detect how independent variables impact hedging in advance, as well as to verify if 
simultaneity bias exists in the regression. Endogeneity was not identified in the regression and 
lagged variables have not affected the result. The impact of the oil price shock on the 
companies´ hedging strategy and on its´ probability of financial distress have been measured 
with least squares dummy variables regression, where dummy variables have been created for 
the period of oil price increase and for the period before that, to stress the contrast of different 
market conditions and identify its` impact on corporate hedging. In order to secure for the 
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valid estimation results and to draw correct inferences, multicollinearity analysis have been 
performed in the interest of checking that the independent variables are not correlated with 
each other. Heteroskedasticity was excluded by White Standard Errors method in Eviews, 
which adjusts for standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and firm serial correlation. 
 
5.2. Conclusions 
The results from six of seven regressions computed within this thesis have shown the stable 
positive relation between Z-Score indicator and amount of hedging, meaning that the more 
financially strong firms are the more they hedge. This empirical finding contradicts to the 
main accepted theoretical baseline, which states that companies prefer to hedge in order to 
maximize their value by reducing probability of financially distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985; 
Nance et al, 1993; Adam, 2006) and therefore rejects the hypothesis that there is a positive 
relationship between the probability of financial distress and amount of hedging. The Z-Score 
indicator shows positive significance at least at 5% level in all regressions except the LSDV 
regression, indicating that variation in companies´ bankruptcy risk indeed effects extent of 
hedging, but in the opposite from the prediction way. Two explanations are appropriate for 
the achieved results, the first one is that the primary motive of using derivative instruments in 
the observed sample of companies was speculation and selective hedging, but not hedging 
itself, since, by definition, with hedging activity companies intend to reduce risk of financial 
distress and relieve themselves from the loss exposure (L. Johnson, 1960). As for the 
companies in the examined sample, they are not financially distressed according to the 
descriptive statistics, as Z-Score indicator is showing 1,9 on average, but do use derivatives 
intensively. Moreover, companies in the chosen sample appear to have a tendency to hedge 
more, the more solvent they are, indicating pure speculative motives by exploiting growing oil 
market and “taking derivative positions with the planned intention to make a profit” according 
to Moosa’s (2010) definition. Another conclusion to draw is that the positive relation between 
hedge ratio and companies’ solvency confirms the reasoning in Stulz’s (1996) and Adam’s 
(2012) theory, that companies need to have a certain level of financial strength as a backup in 
order to use derivatives and take additional risks without jeopardizing their core business. The 
result also confirms Stulz´s (1996) argumentation  that companies, finding themselves in 
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financial distress or very close to it, are not interested in risk reduction and do not have spare 
capital to spend on expensive risk management programs. 
I also found that abnormal oil price increase between 2006 and 2008 has a strong positive 
effect on companies` extent of using derivatives. The relation is obvious and has a very high 
statistically significance of less than 1% level as shown in the Table 4.3. This result also 
contradicts against the theory, which implies that companies should hedge more the more 
financially distressed they are, expecting less hedging under the environment of strong market 
growth and companies´ value maximization. While companies in our case are on the contrary 
showing high hedge ratio, when the oil price are growing with 400% and their welfare is 
maximized, indicating that companies were speculating, or taking derivative positions with 
strong anticipation of profit between 2006 and 2008. 
Period between 2000 and 2005, characterized by constant oil price or slightly increase in oil 
price, does not show significance in explaining change in companies´ hedge ratio in a single 
year. This strongly indicates practice of selective hedging, because it is consistent with 
selectivity of timing and amount of using derivatives and with “incorporation of management 
own market views in the company’s risk management program” as defined by Adam (2006) 
and Stulz (1996). Companies do not hedge a lot when the market is calm, but do hedge 
intensively when the market is showing growth opportunities under the oil price shock period.  
Altman’s Z-Score is not significant in this regression, even after adjusting for standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and firm serial correlation, meaning that degree of financial 
distress has no impact on companies’ amount of hedging under the period of abnormal oil 
price growth. This confirms the speculative motives of the observed companies, because 
degree of financial distress was not taken into account, demonstrating therefore that 
companies’ intention to use derivative instruments was not initiated by hedging or risk 
management motives. 
Leverage is showing positive significance in explaining extent of hedging in four out of seven 
regressions, which confirms evidence found by Dolde (1996) and Love et al (1997) about 
high leveraged firms hedge more, and contradicts to the findings of Mian (1996) and Nance 
(1993) who found no evidence on the relationship and rejects the capital structure motive of 
hedging.  
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I found a negative relation between market-to-book ratio of assets and extent of derivatives 
usage in three out of seven regressions, which is consistent with the finding of Mian (1996) 
and Adam et al (2012). Market-to-book ratio indicates firms´ growth opportunities, therefore 
in the oil and gas industry companies with fewer growth opportunities appear to have more 
developed mines involved in operation and thus larger exposure to oil price changes, 
impacting in more hedging need (Adam, 2012).  
I also found that quick ratio, indicating companies´ ability to meet long-term obligations, has 
a negative relation to the extent of hedging in four out of seven regressions. This is consistent 
with earlier studies on this relationship, since liquidity is considered to be a substitute for 
hedging, explaining the negative correlation between these two alternatives.  
The current study suggests therefore that for the chosen sample of companies in the specific 
industry, oil and gas sector, examined between 2000 and 2008 in US, the theory of hedging 
determinants suggested by Smith and Stulz in 1985 is not confirmed when it comes to the 
positive relation of financial distress on hedging. Instead, I find a negative relation between 
firms´ probability of financial distress and extent to which they use financial derivatives. The 
primary motive of using derivatives for the observed companies was speculation between 
2006 and 2008 and selective hedging during the whole observed period between 2000 and 
2008. The result of my research confirms that firm´s leverage, growth opportunities and 
liquidity determines degree of hedging as it is shown in previous studies.  
Further research in this area could be unlimited. Bigger samples of companies and other 
mining industries could be examined to confirm the relationship between financial distress 
and hedging, as well as examine true motives of using derivatives and what determines 
hedging strategies.  
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Appendixes  
 
 
 
Appendix 1 Hausman test  
 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects 
   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 19.326887 4 0.0007 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     Z(-1) 0.014530 0.017686 0.000005 0.1729 
LEV(-1) 0.012197 0.008859 0.000002 0.0151 
MB(-1) 0.003215 0.001337 0.000000 0.0010 
QR(-1) -0.015104 -0.034334 0.000029 0.0004 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: HR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/25/14   Time: 14:13   
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2008   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 47   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 374  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.235858 0.030814 7.654145 0.0000 
Z(-1) 0.014530 0.013353 1.088153 0.2773 
LEV(-1) 0.012197 0.009751 1.250857 0.2118 
MB(-1) 0.003215 0.005527 0.581773 0.5611 
QR(-1) -0.015104 0.026951 -0.560449 0.5755 
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 
 
 
 
  ZS LEV MTB QR 
 ZS 1,00 -0,02 -0,02 0,54 
 LEV -0,02 1,00 0,07 0,05 
 MTB -0,02 0,07 1,00 0,03 
 QR 0,54 0,05 0,03 1,00 
 
       
 
 
